Yes, by multiple empirical measures—especially in the United States—political polarization is currently at or near historic highs in the modern era (post-WWII or longer), though it is not unprecedented in absolute historical terms and patterns vary by country and metric.
Key Evidence from the US
•Affective polarization (dislike/hatred of the opposing party) has risen sharply. Americans' feelings toward the other party have grown much more negative since the 1970s–1980s. Pew Research and others document that the share of partisans viewing the other side as a "threat to the nation's well-being" or having very unfavorable views is at record levels in decades of polling. Interparty marriage disapproval, social distance, and "partisan sorting" (people living, working, and socializing more exclusively with co-partisans) have increased.
•Ideological polarization: Congress is more polarized than at any point since the late 19th/early 20th century (Reconstruction/Gilded Age era), according to DW-NOMINATE scores and similar metrics tracking roll-call voting. The ideological gap between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate has widened substantially since the 1990s, with fewer moderates and more consistency within parties (Pew, ANES data). Party platforms and elite rhetoric show clearer left-right divides.
•Mass vs. elite: Polarization is stronger among political elites, activists, and the highly engaged than among the general public, but it has filtered down. "Negative partisanship" (voting against the other side more than for one's own) is elevated. Media fragmentation, social media, and geographic/residential sorting amplify this.
•Historical context: Polarization was high in the mid-19th century (leading to the Civil War), during the Progressive Era conflicts, and in earlier partisan eras. The mid-20th century (roughly 1940s–1970s) was unusually depolarized by comparison—a period of bipartisan consensus on many issues amid Cold War pressures and weaker party discipline. Today's levels exceed the post-WWII baseline and approach or surpass some earlier peaks on affective and congressional measures, but violence and institutional breakdown are far lower than in the 1850s–1860s or 1960s unrest periods.
Data sources commonly cited include Pew Research Center long-term trends, American National Election Studies (ANES), General Social Survey, congressional voting scores (e.g., from Voteview/Poole-Rosenthal), and academic work by scholars like Shanto Iyengar, Lilliana Mason, Nolan McCarty, and others.
Nuances and Counterpoints
•Not uniform: On some specific issues (e.g., certain economic or foreign policy topics), overlap persists. Independents and less-engaged citizens remain less polarized. "False polarization" (overestimating how extreme the other side is) is common.
•International variation: Many European multiparty systems show rising polarization (e.g., around populism, immigration, EU), but often less binary "us vs. them" affective hatred than the US two-party system. Some countries have seen depolarization on older cleavages. Global trends are mixed; the US stands out for the speed and intensity of recent affective polarization.
•Drivers (not exhaustive): Party realignment (Southern Democrats → Republicans), rising inequality and cultural/identity issues, primary systems and gerrymandering favoring extremes, cable/internet/social media echo chambers and outrage incentives, elite cues, and declining trust in institutions. Correlation is clearer than single causation.
•Consequences: Higher polarization correlates with legislative gridlock, eroded norms, lower trust, and in extremes greater risk of democratic stress—but the US has so far avoided the worst historical outcomes. It can also clarify choices for voters.
Bottom Line
Compared to the relatively consensual mid-20th century and to most of the last several decades, yes—polarization (particularly affective and elite/ideological) is worse. Relative to the full sweep of US history, it is high but not uniquely catastrophic. Trends can reverse (as they have before) with institutional, cultural, or external shocks. For the latest data, check Pew Research, ANES, or academic reviews tracking these metrics over time.