Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2][3]Yes, by multiple key measures—especially in the U.S.—political polarization is worse than it has been in recent decades (roughly the mid-20th century through the 1990s/early 2000s), though it is not unprecedented across the full span of American history, and absolute levels of division or violence do not match the Civil War era or even the 1960s–1970s in some respects. Polarization takes different forms (elite/ideological, mass issue-based, affective/dislike of the other side, and partisan sorting), and trends vary by measure and timeframe.[1]

Congressional and Elite Polarization

In the U.S. Congress, Democrats and Republicans are farther apart ideologically than at any point in the past 50 years, according to DW-NOMINATE scores (which scale lawmakers based on roll-call voting records on a liberal-conservative dimension, comparable over time). Both parties have become more internally cohesive (far fewer moderates) and moved away from the center, with Republicans shifting more conservatively on average in some analyses and Democrats more liberally in others. Ideological overlap between the parties has essentially vanished since the early 2000s.[1][1]

This has deep roots: Southern realignment, demographic shifts in party coalitions, and the decline of cross-cutting issues contributed over decades. Looking further back via Voteview/NOMINATE data (from the late 19th century onward), current levels represent a post-Reconstruction high and are comparable to peaks in the late 1800s/Gilded Age, when parties were also highly polarized. The mid-20th century (roughly 1930s–1970s) was an unusually bipartisan/low-polarization exception, with heterogeneous parties (e.g., conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Northern Republicans). Polarization is the historical norm more than the mid-century period was. It does not reach Civil War-era intensity in stakes or breakdown.[4][5]

Public Opinion and Issue Polarization

Among the mass public, issue-based polarization (disagreement on policy) has risen notably. A 2026 Cambridge University study using American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1988–2024 and clustering algorithms found a 64% increase in separation between left- and right-leaning opinion clusters. Nearly all of this occurred after 2008 (relatively flat before), peaking around 2020 with some leveling off later. It was driven primarily by the left/progressive cluster becoming substantially more socially liberal (about 31.5% more so by 2024 vs. 1988), while the right shifted only slightly more conservative (~2.8%). Gaps widened across issues like abortion, traditional values, health insurance, and race/discrimination. Partisan/ideological sorting also increased (people’s self-labels better match their issue clusters).[2][6]

Other research confirms Democrats and Republicans have grown more ideologically distant over recent decades, with both moving from the center (at different rates). Latent value divides (e.g., moral/religious) may have been more stable longer-term, but parties now align more closely with them.[7][8]

Affective Polarization (Emotional Dislike)

Americans’ feelings toward the opposing party have grown much colder. Feeling thermometer scores (ANES) show out-party ratings dropping substantially since the 1970s/1980s (e.g., from near-neutral to strongly negative), while in-party ratings stayed relatively stable or declined less. This “affective polarization” or negative partisanship has risen more sharply in the U.S. than in most other OECD/Western countries over recent decades. People increasingly see the other side as a threat, disloyal, or extreme, with rising reports of lost friendships over politics and concerns about violence.[9][10]

Presidential approval gaps by party have also widened dramatically over decades.[11]

Broader and Historical Context

In short, for the living memory of most Americans and compared to the relatively consensus-oriented post-WWII decades, yes—polarization (especially elite, affective, and recent mass issue divides) is worse. It contributes to gridlock, eroded trust, and heightened tensions. However, American politics has long featured sharp partisan conflict, and current levels, while high and problematic, sit within a longer historical pattern rather than being wholly novel extremes. Trends can reverse with institutional, cultural, or crisis-driven changes, as they have before. Data is strongest and most consistent for the U.S.; patterns elsewhere vary.