Yes, by multiple standard measures—especially in the US—political polarization is higher than in the mid-to-late 20th century and approaches or exceeds peaks from the late 19th/early 20th century in elite/institutional metrics, though mass violence and some forms of division are not at historical extremes.
Key Evidence and Trends
Political scientists distinguish ideological polarization (policy/belief divergence), partisan sorting (ideology aligning tightly with party), and affective polarization (emotional dislike/distrust of the out-party). Data shows clear rises:
•Congress and elites: DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole/Rosenthal/McCarty) tracking roll-call voting show House and Senate polarization at levels unseen since the late 1800s–early 1900s. The parties are more internally homogeneous and farther apart than during the mid-20th century "consensus" era of overlapping liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. This tracks with fewer cross-party coalitions and more gridlock on major legislation. Similar patterns appear in state legislatures and donor/activist classes.
•Public opinion and sorting: Pew Research time series show the share of Americans holding consistently liberal or conservative positions rising substantially since the 1990s, with "partisan antipathy" (viewing the other party as a threat) increasing sharply. Feeling thermometer scores and surveys (e.g., American National Election Studies) document growing affective polarization: partisans rate the out-party far more coldly than in the 1970s–80s. Geographic, social, and media sorting amplifies this—people increasingly live, marry, and consume information among the like-minded.
•Affective and behavioral markers: Trust in opposing institutions, willingness to discriminate against out-partisans in hiring/dating, and "negative partisanship" (voting against the other side more than for your own) are elevated. Experimental and survey work (Iyengar, Levendusky, Mason, and others) consistently finds this. Social media and fragmented cable/online media accelerate the perception and reality of distance.
These trends accelerated from the 1990s onward (Newt Gingrich era, media changes, post-2000 sorting) and continued through the Obama, Trump, and Biden years. Cross-national data shows rises in several other democracies too, often tied to cultural/identity issues, immigration, and economic shocks, though the US case is particularly well-measured.
Historical Context: Not Totally Unprecedented
•Worse than the post-WWII decades: The 1950s–1970s featured lower elite polarization, more split-ticket voting, and parties that were coalitions rather than ideologically pure teams. That period looks mild by comparison.
•Comparable to earlier American peaks: Late 19th-century Congress (Gilded Age, Reconstruction aftermath) showed similar or higher DW-NOMINATE divergence amid fights over tariffs, currency, race, and industrialization. The 1850s–60s (slavery/Civil War) and periods of high immigration/nativism were far more violent and existential. 1960s–70s unrest (assassinations, riots, campus bombings, Vietnam) involved more political violence than recent years despite lower formal party polarization.
•Limits of the claim: Mass publics remain less polarized than activists/elites on many specific issues (plenty of centrists exist; "false polarization" leads people to overestimate out-party extremism). Overall political violence and civil conflict remain far below Civil War, Reconstruction, or even 1960s–70s levels. Polarization can reflect real, high-stakes disagreements (institutions, borders, speech, identity, economics) rather than pure irrationality. Some metrics (e.g., economic left-right) show asymmetry or different drivers by party.
Drivers (Briefly)
Institutional (primary systems, gerrymandering less decisive than often claimed, campaign finance), technological (media choice and algorithms), demographic/cultural (immigration, secularization, education sorting), and elite incentives all contribute. Declining cross-cutting identities (religion, unions, localism) make politics more zero-sum. Claims that it is "all one side" usually fail basic time-series tests; both parties moved toward their poles, with issue-specific differences.
For primary sources, see Pew's polarization reports, DW-NOMINATE visualizations from voteview.com, ANES data, and books/papers by McCarty/Poole/Rosenthal, Fiorina (who emphasizes elite vs. mass gaps), Iyengar, and Mason. Trends can reverse with institutional or cultural shifts, but the recent multi-decade rise is real and measurable—not just vibes or media hype.