Yes in specific, measurable ways (especially US elite/partisan and affective polarization since the mid-20th century), but no as an absolute historical peak—earlier eras saw deeper divides, more violence, and existential stakes.
Political polarization means growing divergence in views, identities, or animosity along political lines. It is not one thing: distinguish elite polarization (politicians, parties, activists), ideological/issue polarization (policy positions), affective polarization (dislike/distrust of the other side), and social sorting (party aligning with race, religion, geography, education). Data is strongest for the US; patterns differ elsewhere.
Evidence It Has Increased in Recent Decades
•Elite and congressional polarization: DW-NOMINATE and similar scores show US parties in Congress pulling apart ideologically since the 1970s, after a mid-century period of greater overlap. Southern realignment, primary incentives, and fundraising dynamics contributed. Party platforms and voting records are more consistently liberal/conservative than in the bipartisan-compromise era of the 1950s–60s.
•Affective polarization: American National Election Studies “feeling thermometer” data and Pew Research show partisans rate the opposing party far more coldly than in the 1970s–80s. Out-party animosity, stereotypes, and reluctance to socialize or intermarry across party lines have risen. This tracks with partisan media and social media amplifying negative partisanship.
•Sorting and identity: People have sorted more cleanly into parties by ideology, religiosity, education, and urban/rural lines (Pew, ANES). “Partisan strength” and viewing the other side as a threat to the country have increased. On some cultural issues (abortion, guns, immigration, race-related policies), gaps widened.
•Perception and media: Fragmented media and social platforms make extremes more visible, raising perceived polarization even when average issue positions have milder shifts. Trust in institutions has fallen, which feeds mutual suspicion.
These trends are documented across multiple decades of survey and roll-call data; they are not solely a post-2016 artifact, though recent elections intensified them.
Historical Context: Not Unprecedented, and Often Milder in Outcomes
•Worse or comparable past peaks: The 1850s–1860s (slavery, secession, Civil War) involved irreconcilable sectional polarization ending in mass violence. The 1890s (Populists, labor conflict), 1919–20s Red Scare, 1930s (Depression-era radicalism), and late 1960s–70s (riots, assassinations, campus bombings, Weather Underground) featured intense conflict, political violence, and institutional strain. Partisan newspapers in the 19th century were often more openly vicious than today’s outlets. Loyalty oaths, sedition laws, and street fighting have recurred.
•Violence and stakes today are lower: Despite heated rhetoric, US political violence and assassination rates remain far below 1960s–70s or Civil War levels. Most citizens still hold mixed views; median preference on many economic issues shows less pure polarization than activist discourse implies. Cross-party agreement exists on basics (e.g., Social Security’s existence, opposition to certain extremes). Democratic norms and election administration have so far held under stress better than in some prior crises.
•International variation: Polarization is high in some places (US, parts of Latin America, polarized European multiparty systems under cultural stress) but not universal or steadily worsening everywhere. Consociational or less sorted systems show different patterns. Claims of unique global doom often overfit recent Western cultural conflicts.
Drivers (Not Exhaustive)
Incentives matter: closed primaries, safe seats, nationalized media markets, declining local journalism, education/residential sorting, and identity politics all reward purity and threat narratives over brokerage. Economic inequality and rapid cultural change supply fuel; social media accelerates outrage. Elite cues shape mass affect more than the reverse in many studies. None of this requires a single villain—left, right, or tech.
Bottom Line and Caveats
By the metrics political scientists track most carefully—congressional ideology, partisan animus, and social sorting—US polarization is higher than in the post-WWII consensus period and has worsened over the last 40–50 years. That has real costs (gridlock, eroded trust, harder compromise). It is not clearly “the worst ever” when stacked against slavery crises, world wars’ domestic aftermaths, or sustained political terrorism. Apocalyptic framing itself can worsen affective polarization.
Trends can reverse: realignments, external shocks, institutional reforms (open primaries, different districting, media literacy), or generational shifts have done so before. Data > vibes; track ANES, Pew long-term charts, and NOMINATE rather than peak cable clips. For non-US cases, country-specific legislature and survey series are needed.