No single yes/no answer fits, because "improving the US government" is not a binary or purely technical question. It depends on concrete metrics (size, cost, effectiveness, constitutional fidelity, output) versus subjective values (equity vs. growth, security vs. openness, expertise vs. accountability). Trump's record and current actions show targeted disruptions to bureaucracy, regulation, and certain progressive priorities, mixed with continuity on spending/debt and institutional friction. Here's a breakdown grounded in observable actions and outcomes rather than vibes.
Areas of Measurable Change or Intent
•Deregulation and administrative state: First-term Trump reduced the Federal Register's growth rate and used executive actions + agency guidance to cut rules (e.g., via EO 13771's 2-for-1). This lowered compliance costs in energy, finance, and environment per analyses from the Council of Economic Advisers and outside trackers like the American Action Forum. Current term continues this with rapid EOs targeting DEI mandates, climate rules, and agency overreach, plus Schedule F-style reinstatement to make policy officials more at-will. If you view the permanent bureaucracy as unaccountable and capture-prone (a view shared by some left critics of the "Blob" and right critics of the administrative state), this is improvement. Independent measures of regulatory stock (QuantGov, RegData) showed slower accumulation pre-COVID.
•Personnel and judicial appointments: Confirmed a high volume of originalist/textualist judges, including three Supreme Court justices, shifting the Court away from living-constitutionalism outcomes on issues like agency deference (Chevron overturned later), guns, and abortion. This is structural and durable. Cabinet and agency picks emphasized loyalty and disruption over traditional credentials; results vary by competence.
•Border and immigration enforcement: First-term metrics (CBP data) showed reduced illegal crossings after Remain in Mexico, wall funding, and asylum restrictions—until COVID and policy reversals. Current early actions reverse catch-and-release emphases and restore expedited removal. Illegal immigration imposes fiscal costs (FAIR, CBO estimates in the tens of billions net annually) and strains cities; tighter control is an efficiency/security gain if you prioritize sovereignty and rule-of-law over higher inflows.
•Foreign policy and "forever wars": No new major wars started. Abraham Accords normalized Israel-Arab ties without solving Palestine. Pressure on NATO spending and China tariffs/trade renegotiation (USMCA) were real shifts. Energy exports rose, reducing some leverage vulnerabilities. Critics correctly note transactionalism and alliance strain; supporters note freeriding reduction.
•Efficiency pushes: The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) concept with outside figures aims at waste, duplication, and improper payments (GAO regularly flags $100B+ annually). Federal employment and real spending have grown for decades under both parties; any serious attempt to reverse that is rare. Early signals include freezes and reviews.
Economic context from the first term (BLS, BEA data pre-COVID): low unemployment (including Black and Hispanic lows), real wage gains at the bottom, corporate tax cut to 21% that broadened the base and repatriated capital. These are pro-growth, not "government improvement" per se, but they expand the tax base that funds government. COVID spending and lockdowns blew out deficits—bipartisan failure mode.
Clear Shortcomings and Continuities
•Spending and debt: Deficits rose pre-COVID due to tax cuts + spending deals (no sustained entitlement reform). COVID relief was enormous. Debt/GDP trajectory remained unsustainable (CBO baselines). This matches recent Republican and Democratic patterns; "drain the swamp" did not produce a smaller fiscal footprint. Entitlements + interest dominate; without addressing them, efficiency theater elsewhere is marginal.
•Institutions and norms: Heavy use of EOs, rhetoric against the "deep state," and post-2020 election challenges eroded trust for large shares of the public (see Gallup/Pew on institutional confidence, already declining). Jan 6 was a failure of order. Reciprocal lawfare and agency politicization (intelligence, FBI, public health) predated and outlasted him—see Durham findings, Twitter Files, COVID origin suppression. Both sides escalate.
•Trade-offs and execution: Tariffs are taxes that raise consumer costs and invite retaliation (Tax Foundation, Fed studies); gains in specific manufacturing are real but net GDP effects debated and usually modest/negative. COVID response mixed Operation Warp Speed success against testing delays, mixed messaging, and deficit explosion. Loyalty tests can sideline competence.
•Cultural/administrative priorities: Moves against DEI, gender ideology in agencies/schools, and ESG are corrections if you see those as mission creep and competence eroders (evidence from FAA, military recruitment, corporate studies on viewpoint diversity). They are regressions if you prioritize those frameworks.
Broader Reality Check
US government performance problems are structural and bipartisan: exponential regulatory accumulation since the 1970s, civil service protections that shield poor performers, Congress's abdication to agencies and courts, military procurement bloat, education ROI collapse despite spending, and entitlement demographics. Trust in federal government hovers near historic lows for reasons that predate Trump (Pew). Trump accelerates a populist correction against expert-class insulation and open-borders/fiscal incontinence consensus—more than most recent presidents—but he is not a systematic reformer of incentives like base-closing commissions or BRAC-style processes. Outcomes will hinge on whether DOGE-style cuts stick, Congress reclaims power, and courts police the administrative state, versus chaos, capture by new interests, or simple reversion.
If your metric is "more progressive redistribution, climate rules, and institutional continuity," the answer is no. If it is "less regulation, tighter borders, originalist courts, and challenging agency autonomy," directionally yes with big asterisks on fiscal restraint and execution. Track primary data (OMB, CBO, BLS, CBP, Federal Register, GAO) over narratives.