Yes, in several measurable ways—especially in the US over the last 40–50 years—political polarization (particularly affective/negative partisanship and elite ideological sorting) is worse than the mid-20th-century baseline, though it is not unprecedented in American or global history and does not match the intensity of eras like the Civil War.
Key Distinctions and Evidence
Polarization is not one thing. Distinguish:
•Ideological/issue polarization: Distance between policy positions.
•Affective polarization: Emotional dislike, distrust, or viewing the other side as a threat/enemy.
•Elite vs. mass: Politicians, activists, and media vs. average voters.
•Sorting: People aligning party, ideology, identity, geography, and social networks more cleanly (which amplifies conflict even without everyone becoming extreme).
Recent US trends (roughly 1970s–present) show clear increases:
•Congress and elites: DW-NOMINATE and similar scores document parties becoming more internally homogeneous and distant from each other. Bipartisan overlap that existed in the mid-20th century (conservative Democrats, liberal Republicans) has largely vanished. Party-line voting is near historic highs for the modern era. This is extensively documented in political science (e.g., work by Poole, Rosenthal, McCarty, and others).
•Affective polarization: Pew Research, ANES, and academic studies (Iyengar, Westwood, etc.) show Republicans and Democrats increasingly dislike, distrust, and attribute negative traits to the other side. Measures of “social distance” (unwillingness to marry, befriend, or live near the other party) have risen. Negative partisanship—voting against the other side more than for one’s own—has grown.
•Public opinion and behavior: On high-salience cultural/identity issues (abortion, guns, immigration, race-related policies, LGBT issues), gaps have widened. Geographic and social sorting (partisan media diets, residential patterns, friendship networks) reinforces this. Trust in institutions is highly asymmetric by party.
•Media and information environment: Fragmented, high-choice media + social media accelerate outrage cycles and reduce shared facts relative to the broadcast era.
These patterns are stronger among the politically engaged, college-educated, and online than among the median low-engagement voter, who often remains more moderate or cross-pressured on many pocketbook issues.
Historical perspective—not the worst ever:
•The mid-20th century (roughly 1940s–1970s) was an unusually low-polarization period by US standards: broad New Deal/Cold War consensus, overlapping parties, and less nationalized culture-war combat. Comparing only to that era makes today look uniquely bad.
•Earlier peaks were far more severe in violence and stakes: the 1850s–1860s (slavery, secession, Civil War), Reconstruction and Jim Crow conflicts, the 1890s populist/labor strife, and the 1960s–1970s (assassinations, urban riots, campus bombings, Vietnam). Those involved actual breakdowns of order, not just mean tweets and primary challenges.
•American politics has long featured intense factionalism; the Constitution’s design assumed it. What’s newer is the combination of nationalized media, polarized institutions, and identity fusion of party with race/religion/education/urban-rural divides.
•Cross-nationally, many democracies show rising affective polarization or populist surges (Europe, Latin America), but patterns differ; some multiparty systems diffuse it differently than US two-party presidentialism.
Important Caveats and Counterpoints
•Not everything is polarized: On many concrete policy details, economic issues, or valence issues (competence, corruption), public opinion can be less divided or more pragmatic than elite rhetoric suggests. “Polarization” sometimes confuses elite performance with mass preferences.
•Asymmetry debates: Data sometimes show asymmetric movement (e.g., one party shifting more on specific dimensions, or differences in authoritarian attitudes, conspiracy belief, or institutional trust). Honest analysis looks at the specific metric rather than assuming perfect symmetry. Both sides have contributed via primary incentives, donor pressure, and media ecosystems.
•Measurement and perception: People overestimate how extreme the other side is (pluralistic ignorance). Social media and cable news over-sample the loudest activists. Some “polarization” is better described as clarification after earlier parties were ideologically muddled.
•Causes are multi-factorial: Realignment after the Civil Rights era and Southern Strategy, economic/cultural changes, inequality and education divides, primary systems, gerrymandering (modest effect), and especially the post-broadcast media environment. No single villain.
•Trends can reverse or stabilize: Polarization is not monotonic forever. Cross-cutting identities, economic shocks, external threats, or institutional reforms can reduce it. Recent elections continue to show large numbers of persuadable or ticket-splitting voters even amid high partisan heat.
Bottom Line
Relative to the post-WWII consensus decades, yes—US political polarization (elite ideology + mass affect + social sorting) is substantially worse and more nationally encompassing. Relative to the full sweep of US history, it is high and corrosive to norms and trust but still short of the civil-conflict peaks. The practical risks are gridlock, eroded institutional legitimacy, lower social trust, and occasional political violence or democratic stress—not inevitable collapse. Data sources worth reading directly include Pew’s long-term values surveys, ANES time series, DW-NOMINATE congressional data, and reviews by scholars such as Fiorina (on sorting vs. polarization), Iyengar (affective), and Levitsky/Ziblatt or others on institutional strains.