Yes, by several standard measures in the United States (the most-studied case), political polarization is higher now than it has been for much of the 20th century—though it is not unprecedented in American history, and the picture is more mixed globally or on non-elite measures.
Recent U.S. Trends (Elite and Mass Levels)
•Congressional/elite polarization: Nominate/DW-Nominate scores and similar roll-call metrics show the two major parties have grown steadily more ideologically distant and internally homogeneous since the 1970s–1980s. Overlap between the parties in Congress has largely disappeared; the most conservative Democrats are now routinely to the left of the most liberal Republicans on the main economic/ideological dimension. This is higher than mid-20th-century levels (when conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans were common) and approaches or exceeds late-19th/early-20th-century peaks in some series. Party-line voting is near historic highs.
•Affective polarization: Surveys (Pew, ANES, YouGov, etc.) document rising dislike, distrust, and negative stereotyping of the opposing party since the 1980s–1990s. Larger shares of partisans now say the other side is a threat to the country’s well-being, would be unhappy if their child married someone from the other party, and attribute extreme negative traits to out-partisans. This “us vs. them” animosity has risen faster than pure issue disagreement in some datasets.
•Issue and ideological sorting: Partisans have sorted more cleanly by ideology, race, religion, education, geography, and media diet. Pew’s long-term data show wider gaps on many cultural, economic, and racial issues. Self-identified liberals and conservatives are more consistently left/right across issues than in the 1990s. Geographic and social sorting amplifies this (people live, marry, and worship with co-partisans more).
•Other indicators: Primary electorates and activists are more extreme than the median voter; trust in institutions is polarized by party; and social media/media fragmentation correlates with stronger in-group signaling (though causality is debated).
These trends are documented across political science sources (e.g., work by McCarty, Poole, Rosenthal; Fiorina’s caveats on “sorting vs. polarization”; Iyengar and others on affective polarization; Pew’s recurring reports). They accelerated after the 1990s and especially post-2000s/2010s, coinciding with asymmetric media ecosystems, nationalized elections, and declining cross-cutting cleavages.
Historical Context: Not the Absolute Peak
•Worse periods exist: The Civil War and Reconstruction era involved literal secession, mass violence, and irreconcilable conflict over slavery and sovereignty—far beyond today’s polarization. The 1790s (Federalists vs. Jeffersonians) featured extreme rhetoric, sedition laws, and fears of civil conflict. The late 19th century Gilded Age/populist era had intense sectional, class, and monetary conflicts with high congressional polarization. The 1960s–1970s included assassinations, urban riots, campus bombings, and Vietnam-era divisions that produced higher political violence than the present.
•Milder recent past: The mid-20th century (roughly 1930s–1970s) was an unusually depolarized period by U.S. standards—broad New Deal consensus on some economic issues, overlapping parties, and lower affective hostility in many surveys—making the post-1970s rise look sharper by comparison.
•Violence and stability: Despite heated rhetoric, contemporary U.S. polarization has not (yet) produced Civil War-scale breakdown or 1960s-level sustained political violence. Democratic institutions, federalism, and norms have so far constrained escalation, though trust erosion and contested elections are warning signs.
Important Nuances and Caveats
•Elite vs. mass: Politicians, donors, activists, and media are more polarized than the median voter. Many Americans remain moderate or cross-pressured on specific issues (Fiorina and others emphasize this); “polarization” sometimes reflects better sorting into parties rather than everyone racing to the extremes.
•Asymmetry debates: Some data show steeper movement on the right (e.g., certain cultural/immigration issues or congressional scores); others show symmetric affective rises or leftward shifts on social issues among Democrats. Evidence is contested and issue-dependent—avoid simplistic “both sides equal” or “one side only” claims.
•Measurement: Self-reported ideology, feeling thermometers, and roll calls capture different things. Social desirability, question wording, and online samples can inflate apparent extremes. International comparisons (e.g., multiparty European systems) often show different patterns; some democracies have high fragmentation without U.S.-style two-party affective hate.
•Causes (correlational, not monocausal): Party sorting after the civil-rights realignment, economic inequality and cultural change, primary systems, cable/internet media, declining local journalism, and identity-based politics all contribute. “Worse than the past” does not automatically mean “caused by [your least favorite factor].”
•Consequences: Higher polarization correlates with gridlock, lower trust, and harder compromise, but also with clearer choices for voters. It is not identical to “incivility” or “extremism.”
Bottom Line
On the metrics political scientists track most carefully—ideological distance in government, partisan animosity, and consistent sorting—U.S. polarization is worse than the relatively consensual mid-to-late 20th century and ranks among the higher periods in the last 150 years. It is still well short of the existential conflicts of the 1850s–1860s. Trends can reverse (they have before), and outcomes depend on institutions and leadership more than raw polarization scores alone. For primary data, see Pew Research time series, ANES feeling thermometers, Voteview/DW-Nominate, and reviews in the Annual Review of Political Science. Global or non-U.S. cases require separate country-specific evidence.