No universal "should"—it depends on values, evidence of trade-offs, jurisdiction, and what "more heavily" specifically means. Gun regulation involves competing goods: individual self-defense and autonomy versus reducing misuse, accidents, suicides, and homicides. Evidence is mixed, often confounded by culture, enforcement, illegal markets, mental health, and socioeconomic factors. Blanket claims that "more regulation always saves lives" or "any regulation is tyranny" both oversimplify.
Arguments for heavier regulation
•Public safety externalities: Guns amplify lethality. In the US (high ownership ~120 civilian firearms per 100 people), CDC data show ~40,000–50,000 gun deaths annually in recent years; majority are suicides, with homicides concentrated among young males in specific urban areas, often involving illegal guns. Mass public shootings, while rare relative to total deaths, have high visibility and body counts facilitated by rapid-fire capability and capacity. Stricter rules (universal background checks, waiting periods, licensing, storage requirements, prohibitions for domestic abusers/violent felons) aim to raise barriers for high-risk people without relying solely on post-crime punishment.
•Comparative patterns: Countries with tighter controls (Japan, UK, Australia post-1996, many EU states) have far lower gun homicide rates. Australia's NFA buyback and restrictions correlated with drops in firearm suicides and mass shootings (though overall homicide trends and substitution effects are debated; see studies by Leigh/Nevill, Chapman et al., vs. critics). Easy access correlates with higher gun suicide completion rates.
•Polls and incrementalism: Large majorities in US surveys (Gallup, Pew) support specific measures like background checks at gun shows/private sales or red-flag laws. Proponents argue existing US framework (federal prohibitions + state variation) has gaps exploited by straw purchases and theft.
•Children/accidents and crime guns: Secure storage laws and age minimums target preventable deaths; tracing data (ATF) often links crime guns to recent legal purchases that diverted.
Arguments against heavier regulation
•Self-defense and rights: The core case is that law-abiding people face imminent threats (home invasions, riots, delayed police response). Estimates of defensive gun uses vary wildly (Kleck ~2M/year vs. lower NCVS figures), but even lower-end numbers and cases like the 2022 half-sibling defense or store owners during unrest illustrate the point. Disarming victims does not disarm criminals. In the US, the Second Amendment (District of Columbia v. Heller, McDonald, Bruen) protects an individual right to keep/bear common arms for self-defense; "more heavily" often means effective bans or permits that courts scrutinize for historical analogy.
•Criminals ignore laws; enforcement gaps matter more: Homicide offenders are disproportionately prior felons or prohibited persons. Most crime guns are illegally obtained. Heavy regulations can create black markets, raise costs for legal owners, and leave compliance theater (see Chicago/NYC strict laws + high illegal gun violence). "Assault weapon" bans (1994–2004 federal) showed weak or null effects on overall gun crime in multiple studies (Koper, RAND reviews); rifles are a small % of gun homicides (FBI UCR: handguns dominate).
•Substitution, culture, and root causes: Switzerland/Czechia have high ownership + training/shall-issue cultures with low misuse. US gun homicide is not uniformly "high ownership → high death"; rates vary enormously by city/demographics, tracking gang activity, family structure, and lead exposure/impulsivity more than rural hunting areas. Suicides involve many methods; focusing only on guns ignores mental health access. International low-gun-crime places often have low overall violence, different demographics, and heavier policing of disorder.
•Slippery slope and efficacy failures: "Common sense" measures expand (NY SAFE Act, California roster, magazine bans with little violence drop). Shall-issue concealed carry expansions (many US states) did not produce the bloodbaths predicted; some research (Lott, others) finds neutral-to-crime-reducing effects via deterrence, though contested (National Research Council, RAND: inconclusive). Confiscatory approaches face massive noncompliance (as in parts of Australia/NZ/Canada debates) and require enforcement resources better spent on actual violent predators.
Evidence quality and confounders
RAND, National Academy of Sciences, and crime economists repeatedly find many specific policies have inconclusive or small effects once you control for trends, concurrent policing changes, and reporting. Homicide fell sharply in the 1990s US across ban/no-ban areas. COVID-era spikes tracked social disruption more than gun sales. Legal owners pass background checks at high rates; the problem set is skewed. "Guns" are not monolithic—handguns vs. rifles vs. shotguns differ in crime involvement. Illegal trafficking from loose to strict jurisdictions is real.
Culture and compliance dominate paper rules. Japan’s near-total ban works with its low base violence and social trust; the same rules in high-violence US cities do not magically import those conditions. Mental health commitment standards, focused deterrence on gangs (e.g., proven pulling-levers strategies), and prosecuting straw purchasers/felon-in-possession often outperform broad ownership hurdles.
Trade-offs are real
Heavier regulation can reduce some suicides, accidents, and impulsive homicides at the cost of friction for self-defense, sport, collecting, and rural/pest control uses, plus risks of politicized enforcement or gradual erosion of legal ownership. Lighter regulation accepts higher misuse risk for broader access and rights. Data do not support "zero regulation" in dense modern societies or "only police/military guns." Optimal policy is local, evidence-updated, and distinguishes peaceable citizens from prohibited persons—while admitting many studies are weak due to endogeneity and data limits.
If the question is US-centric (most heated context), constitutional text + Bruen history-and-tradition test constrains options more than pure utilitarianism. Elsewhere, parliamentary systems weigh costs differently. For concrete policies, demand rigorous evaluations (not advocacy stats) on the exact lever proposed.