Short answer: In the United States, yes—by several commonly used measures polarization is higher than at any time in the modern (post–World War II) era, though it has not reached Civil War–era extremes. In other democracies, polarization has generally risen since the 1990s–2000s, but the scale and pattern vary a lot by country and electoral system.
What “worse” means
•Ideological (issue) polarization: how far apart the sides are on policies.
•Affective polarization: how much partisans dislike and distrust the other side.
•Elite vs mass: elected officials have polarized differently (and more) than the public.
United States
•Among elected officials: Roll‑call voting data (e.g., DW‑NOMINATE scores) show Democrats and Republicans have moved apart steadily since the late 1970s; the parties now almost never overlap ideologically. This is the highest congressional polarization in at least 100 years.
•Among the public on issues: Average voters haven’t become uniformly more extreme on most policies, but they have “sorted” so that ideology, party, geography, race, and religion now line up more consistently. Cross‑pressured voters are rarer.
•Affective polarization: Surveys since the late 1970s show a large, sustained rise in dislike of the opposing party; the gap between ratings of one’s own party and the other party has roughly doubled or more. Social distance measures (e.g., comfort with a child marrying someone from the other party) show similar trends.
•Electoral behavior: Split‑ticket voting and swing districts have fallen to historic lows; straight‑party voting has risen; state and national elections are more “nationalized.”
•Historical context: The 1850s were more polarized (and violent). The 1890s also saw intense partisan conflict. The 1960s–70s were turbulent socially, but the parties were less ideologically sorted (conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans still existed), so elite polarization was lower than today.
Outside the U.S.
•Advanced democracies: Many have seen increases in affective polarization since the 2000s, but the U.S. is an outlier at or near the top. Countries with proportional representation often spread conflict across multiple parties, which can mitigate a two‑camp standoff even if ideological dispersion is high.
•Not uniform: Polarization has spiked in some places (e.g., UK around Brexit; Poland, Hungary, Turkey; parts of Latin America and South Asia) and remained flatter or cycled in others. Measurement is trickier where party systems change frequently.
Commonly cited drivers
•Party realignment and identity sorting (race, religion, urban–rural).
•Media fragmentation, cable news, and social media.
•Nationalized politics, fewer local cross‑party coalitions, and primary electorates.
•Geographic sorting and gerrymandering (contribute, but are not sole causes).
•Rising economic inequality and zero‑sum perceptions.
•Negative partisanship and elite “hardball” tactics.
Bottom line: Compared with the last half‑century, U.S. political polarization—especially among elites and in how partisans view each other—is near modern highs. It’s not unprecedented in American history, but it is unusually intense for the contemporary era. Internationally, polarization has generally risen but with substantial variation across countries and systems.