Yes, in multiple concrete domains. The People's Republic of China under CCP rule is the primary strategic competitor to the United States and actively works against core U.S. interests in security, technology, economic rules, and political influence. This is not cartoonish "Yellow Peril" rhetoric or inevitable war; it is observable policy, capability, and intent. Competition does not preclude trade or limited cooperation on narrow issues (climate data, fentanyl precursors, pandemic surveillance), but interdependence has not moderated CCP behavior.
Military and Security
•Force structure and posture: China has built the world's largest navy by hull count, expanded its nuclear arsenal, fielded advanced anti-access/area-denial systems (missiles, sensors, hypersonics), and militarized the South China Sea in violation of the 2016 arbitral ruling. It conducts regular large-scale exercises simulating blockades or attacks on Taiwan, while stating that "reunification" can involve force. This directly threatens U.S. treaty allies (Japan, Philippines, Australia via AUKUS), freedom of navigation, and the First Island Chain.
•Gray-zone and espionage: Persistent cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure, IP theft on a massive scale (DOJ and FBI assessments over years), and United Front work targeting diaspora, universities, and local politics. These erode deterrence and steal the fruits of U.S. R&D.
•Alignment patterns: Material support to Russia’s war economy, deep ties with Iran and North Korea, and efforts to fracture U.S. alliance networks. Nuclear and conventional modernization aims at credible capability to keep the U.S. out of a regional fight.
U.S. defense planning documents across administrations treat China as the "pacing challenge" for good reason: the scale and trajectory exceed Russia or others.
Economic and Technological
•Non-market practices: Systematic IP theft, forced technology transfer, subsidies to national champions, and market access barriers have hollowed out segments of U.S. manufacturing and created chokepoints (rare earths, pharmaceuticals, solar, batteries, shipbuilding). The "Made in China 2025" and dual-circulation strategies explicitly target dominance in strategic sectors.
•Supply-chain leverage: COVID exposed over-reliance; China has demonstrated willingness to weaponize trade (Australia barley/wine, Lithuania, rare earth threats). TikTok/ByteDance and similar platforms raise data and influence concerns that are not symmetric with U.S. firms in China.
•Tech decoupling reality: Export controls on advanced semiconductors, entity lists, and outbound investment screening exist because unrestricted flows accelerate PLA modernization and surveillance state capabilities used against Uyghurs, Hong Kong, and domestic dissent. China's civil-military fusion doctrine makes pure "commercial" distinctions unreliable.
U.S. firms profit from the Chinese market and consumers get cheap goods; those are real interests. They do not negate the predatory elements or the long-term risk of dependency on an opaque, authoritarian system.
Political and Normative
The CCP’s model—techno-authoritarianism, social credit, zero-COVID excesses, Xinjiang camps, Hong Kong national security law—is offered as an alternative to liberal order. Influence efforts (Confucius Institutes historically, elite capture, narrative control via state media and proxies) aim to shape speech and policy abroad. This collides with U.S. interests in open societies, alliance cohesion, and rules that protect smaller states from coercion.
Counterpoints and Limits
•Interdependence cuts both ways: China needs external demand, technology, and stability more than the slogan "national rejuvenation" admits. Its property sector debt, demographic collapse, youth unemployment, and capital flight are self-inflicted drags. A prosperous, non-aggressive China integrated on reciprocal terms would not be a threat.
•U.S. agency: Many problems stem from prior U.S. policy choices (offshoring without safeguards, under-investment in shipbuilding/industrial base, inconsistent export controls). Threat inflation that ignores U.S. strengths (alliances, finance, energy, demographics, innovation culture) or that seeks perpetual conflict is counterproductive.
•Not monolithic or existential in the Soviet sense: Nuclear deterrence holds. Chinese society is not uniformly hostile. Miscalculation over Taiwan is the clearest path to catastrophe; prudent deterrence + off-ramps matter.
•Overstatement risks: Treating every Chinese student or business as a spy, or decoupling so abruptly that it wrecks U.S. firms, damages American interests. Capability ≠ imminent invasion.
Bottom Line
China is a threat to U.S. interests where the CCP seeks military primacy in Asia, technological leadership via non-reciprocal means, and insulation from democratic accountability or criticism. Empirical record—SCS bases, Taiwan pressure, espionage cases, economic coercion—supports this over wishful "responsible stakeholder" narratives from earlier decades. The response that best serves U.S. interests is hard-nosed competition: allied burden-sharing, selective decoupling in chokepoint tech, military posture that raises the costs of aggression, and domestic revitalization. Denial or endless engagement-without-leverage has already been tested and found wanting. For primary sources, see U.S. DoD China Military Power reports, USTR Section 301 findings, and CCP authoritative documents (e.g., on dual circulation and Taiwan).