Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

Yes, by multiple standard measures, political polarization in the United States (the primary focus of most data and research) is higher than it has been in recent decades—particularly since the mid-to-late 20th century—and in some respects approaches or exceeds levels not seen since the late 19th or early 20th century. However, it is not the worst in absolute historical terms when compared to eras like the Civil War period.[1][2]

Polarization has two main forms: ideological (differences in policy positions and values) and affective (emotional dislike, distrust, or viewing the other side as a threat). It can be measured among elites (e.g., Congress) or the mass public. Both have risen substantially in recent decades, though nuances exist (e.g., some asymmetry by party, variation by issue, and possible recent leveling).

Elite/Congressional Polarization

Congressional voting patterns, tracked via DW-NOMINATE scores (which place legislators on a liberal-conservative dimension based on roll-call votes), show the parties farther apart than at any point in the past 50 years—and by many accounts higher than since the late 1800s/early 1900s (post-Reconstruction or Gilded Age peaks).[2][3]

Co-sponsorship networks and other collaboration metrics show similar rising “strong” and “weak” polarization (tighter within-party clusters and less cross-party work).

Mass Public: Ideological Polarization and Sorting

Surveys from Pew Research Center, Gallup, American National Election Studies (ANES), and others document growing gaps:

Partisan sorting has increased: demographics, geography, religion, education, and issue positions align more tightly with party. Views across issues are more correlated (less “cross-cutting”). Geographic sorting within states rose substantially.[2]

Some research finds both parties moved from the center (at different rates), or that Democratic voters became more heterogeneous after ~2010 on certain dimensions, while overall distance grew.[10]

Affective Polarization

Emotional hostility has surged. Unfavorable views of the opposing party roughly doubled from the 1990s to 2010s, with “very unfavorable” views at record highs. Large majorities in both parties have viewed the other side’s victory as causing “lasting harm.” Willingness for inter-party marriage has plummeted in surveys. People increasingly see opponents as threats to the nation’s well-being or democracy itself.[11][1]

This “us vs. them” dynamic appears more intense than in many peer democracies and has risen since the early 2000s.[11]

Historical Context: Worse Than Recent Past, But Not All of History

Today’s polarization feels especially pervasive because it is nationalized, amplified by media/social media, sorted demographically/geographically, and accompanied by declining trust and shared facts. Some argue it rivals the most intense non-Civil War periods. Others note the public remains less extreme than elites, with more overlap on specifics than rhetoric suggests, and that younger generations may show less polarization on some metrics (driven more by period effects and within-generation sorting).[16]

Broader Notes

Globally, affective “us vs. them” polarization has risen in many places since ~2005, but clear issue polarization increases are not universal; the U.S. stands out among wealthy democracies for persistence and intensity.[11][8]

In short: Relative to the living memory of most Americans and the post-WWII baseline, yes—polarization (especially affective and elite ideological) is worse and has intensified notably since the 1990s and particularly after 2008. Absolute historical peaks like the Civil War remain unmatched. Trends can shift with events, leadership, media environments, and generational change, and not every measure moves in lockstep. Data come primarily from U.S. sources like Pew, Gallup, ANES, Voteview/DW-NOMINATE, and academic studies.