Is political polarization worse than it's been in the past?

[1][2][3][4]Yes, in several key measurable dimensions—particularly among political elites and in terms of emotional (affective) hostility between partisans—political polarization in the United States is worse than it has been for much of the recent past (roughly the post-World War II era or since the 1970s), though it is not without historical precedent in the broader sweep of U.S. history.[1]

Polarization is multifaceted: it includes ideological or issue-based divides (how far apart groups are on policy views), affective polarization (dislike or animosity toward the other side), partisan sorting (alignment of ideology, identity, geography, etc., with party), and elite vs. mass levels. Data from sources like the American National Election Studies (ANES), Pew Research, DW-NOMINATE congressional scores, and recent academic studies show clear upward trends in recent decades, with acceleration in some areas after ~2008 or in the 2010s. Comparisons to deeper history (e.g., Civil War era) temper claims that it is "the worst ever."

Elite/Congressional Polarization

Parties in Congress have grown much more ideologically distant and internally homogeneous. DW-NOMINATE scores (which scale legislators based on roll-call voting) show the gap between average Democratic and Republican positions declining in the early-to-mid 20th century, remaining relatively moderate mid-century (with more overlap and cross-party coalitions), then rising steadily since the 1970s. Overlap between the parties has collapsed to near zero, and current levels are among the highest since the late 19th/early 20th century (post-Reconstruction).[5]

This has been somewhat asymmetric, with Republicans shifting further right on average in recent decades, while Democratic movement leftward partly reflects the realignment of Southern conservatives out of the party. Party unity votes have also risen. This elite polarization contributes to gridlock and shapes public cues.[6]

Mass Ideological/Issue Polarization and Sorting

Public opinion shows increased polarization on issues and greater partisan-ideological consistency. A 2020s University of Cambridge analysis of ANES data (1988–2024) found issue polarization (separation between left- and right-leaning opinion clusters) rose ~64% overall, with nearly all the increase after 2008 (flat in the 1990s/early 2000s). It was driven mainly by the left cluster becoming substantially more socially liberal (~31.5%), while the right shifted only modestly more conservative (~2.8%). Polarization may have leveled somewhat recently but remains elevated.[1][7]

Pew data (1994–2017 and later) show more Americans holding consistently liberal or conservative views, with stronger links to partisanship, especially among the politically engaged. Partisan sorting has increased: people increasingly align their party ID with ideology, values, and social identities. Some research finds underlying "latent" value divides (e.g., on moral/religious issues) have been relatively stable for decades, but parties have better sorted around them, amplifying partisan differences. Geographic and demographic sorting (e.g., by education, urban/rural) also plays a role. Younger generations are sometimes less polarized on certain issues than Boomers, with rises driven more by period effects hitting all ages.[2][8][9]

Affective Polarization (Emotional Hostility)

This has risen sharply and is a major concern. ANES feeling thermometers (0–100 "warmth" ratings) show in-party ratings relatively stable (around 70), while out-party ratings have plummeted (from near-neutral ~48 in the late 1970s to ~20–26 recently). The in-minus-out gap has roughly doubled (from ~20–25 points to ~50+). Extreme cold ratings (near 0) for the other party have surged.[10][3]

Pew and other surveys show rising stereotypes: large majorities now view the other party as more immoral, dishonest, or closed-minded than other Americans (sharp increases since the mid-2010s). Social distance has grown dramatically—e.g., discomfort with a child marrying someone from the other party rose from ~5% in 1960 to around half in recent decades. The U.S. has shown one of the largest increases in affective polarization among comparable democracies. Out-party "hate" often outweighs in-party "love" as a driver.[4][11]

Historical Context and Caveats

Polarization is not uniform: it varies by issue (stronger on cultural/identity topics than pure economics in some data), is higher among elites and engaged citizens, and has international parallels (though the U.S. increase in affective polarization stands out). Some studies note potential recent stabilization or that mass ideological divergence is less extreme than affective/elite versions. Progress on equality for various groups has itself been a source of backlash and sorting.

In short, yes—measurable polarization (especially affective and elite) is higher than in the relatively less polarized mid-to-late 20th century baseline many compare against, contributing to dysfunction, reduced trust, and heightened tensions. It is serious but manageable relative to America's most divided historical moments, and not inevitable or irreversible. Data continue to evolve with new elections and surveys.